Abstract-In the aftermath of the consumer debt-induced recession, policymakers have questioned whether fiscal stimulus is effective during periods of high consumer indebtedness. This study empirically investigates this question. Using detailed data on Department of Defense spending for the 2007-2009 period, we document that the open-economy relative fiscal multiplier is higher in geographies with higher consumer debt. The results suggest that in the short term (2007)(2008)(2009), fiscal policy can mitigate the adverse effect of consumer (over)leverage on real economic output during a recession. We then exploit detailed microdata to show that both heterogeneous marginal propensities to consume and slack-driven economic mechanisms contribute to the debt-dependent multiplier.
In this paper, we use detailed new data on Department of Defense (DOD) spending to evaluate whether government spending during the Great Recession stimulates local economic growth differently across geographies with varying levels of prerecession consumer indebtedness. We find that consumer debt is an important determinant of the fiscal multiplier during the Great Recession. During the [2007] [2008] [2009] period, the DOD spending multiplier is higher in geographies with higher prerecession consumer debt-to-income ratios than in geographies with lower prerecession consumer debt-to-income ratios. 2 We then exploit detailed microdata to evaluate whether aggregate demand and aggregate supply economic mechanisms contribute to the debt-dependent multiplier.
Our analysis is based on DOD spending data that cover purchases and obligated funds from $25 to multimillion-dollar contracts since 2000. We observe the start and end dates of the contracts, the primary contractor locations, and the postal code in which the majority of the work was performed. Armed with the granular DOD spending data, we combine the empirical approaches of Mian and Sufi (2015) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) to implement an instrumental variable analysis that evaluates how prerecession consumer debt-toincome ratios and the change in DOD spending from 2007 to 2009 affect economic output over this period. The detailed nature of this new DOD spending data allows us to conduct the analysis at the core-based statistical area (CBSA) level and hence better capture the heterogeneity in consumer leverage. Moreover, it permits us to focus on the recessionary period with high total consumer debt and rapid deleveraging by conducting a purely cross-sectional analysis.
Our results suggest that DOD spending multipliers exhibit significant heterogeneity across CBSAs with different prerecession levels of consumer leverage. The difference in the multiplier between the 75th and 25th percentiles of the consumer-leverage distribution is about the same as the average CBSA open-economy fiscal multiplier. 3 The results suggest that at least in a short to medium run, expansionary fiscal stimulus during a deleveraging recession can mitigate the adverse effects of consumer debt overhang on economic growth: a 1 percentage point increase in government spending relative to local income offsets the adverse effects of consumer indebtedness by about 16%.
In the second half of the paper (section IV), we examine the validity of two economic mechanisms that could contribute to the debt-dependent multiplier. First, fiscal multipliers might depend on debt-driven heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume (MPCs). Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) suggest that consumption of high-debt, credit-constrained households responds strongly to fiscal stimulus, while consumption of nondebt-constrained agents is relatively unaffected by additional income. The resulting higher MPCs among highly levered leveraged consumers should lead to higher fiscal multipliers. In contrast, recent empirical studies document that high-debt households use additional income to pay down debt rather than to spend (Sahm et al., 2015; Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2014) . These studies suggest that deleveraging can be associated with less effective fiscal policy if debt-ridden households are characterized by lower MPCs.
We use detailed microdata to evaluate whether government spending leads to higher consumption responses for high-debt households. Specifically, we exploit individuallevel measures of consumer debt-to-income ratios along with two measures of household consumption: (a) individual-level consumer credit card balances and (b) postal code-level new car registrations. 4 We find that consumption of high debt-toincome households responds more positively to an increase in DOD spending during the crisis period than consumption of low debt-to-income households. We also show that this consumption is unlikely to be funded via an increase in borrowing.
Second, we evaluate whether debt-dependent multipliers arise due to local labor market slack. Geographies with higher debt-to-income households experienced deeper cuts in real economic activity and higher levels of unemployment during the Great Recession (Mian & Sufi, 2011 . In the presence of the resulting slack, fiscal stimulus should be more effective in stimulating the local economy because it is less likely to crowd out private sector employment (Michaillat, 2012; Murphy, 2017) .
Directly testing the slack channel is not possible in our setting because slack during the recession is endogenous to government spending and consumer debt. Instead, we adopt an indirect approach and document debt-dependent fiscal multipliers in the tradable sector of the economy. This sector is subject to local labor market conditions (slack) but is unlikely to directly benefit from local household spending. We further isolate specific industries that do not directly benefit from local individual consumption such as the National Security and International Affairs sector (NAICS 9811) . We find that the positive effect of DOD spending on local employment in the national security sector increases with the local consumer debt-to-income ratio, despite consumer leverage having no direct effect on employment in this sector. The dependence of this multiplier on prerecession consumer indebtedness suggests that slack dependence may also contribute to debt-dependent multipliers during the Great Recession.
Overall, our results indicate that the benefits of fiscal stimulus-higher income and employment-are higher in geographies suffering from consumer debt overhang. While we explore only the relative multiplier and do not evaluate the long-term costs of fiscal stimulus (e.g., public debt and future tax burdens), our results offer an important implication: the ills of private debt overhang can be mitigated, at least in the short run, by government spending. Fiscal policy is relatively more effective at stimulating income and employment in areas with high consumer debt-to-income ratios compared to areas with low consumer debt-to-income ratios.
This paper contributes to a number of strands of literature on fiscal policy and consumer behavior. First, we contribute to the debate about the efficacy of fiscal policy during consumerdebt-overhang-induced slumps. Inspired by the 2007 crisis, an emerging theoretical literature explores optimal policy during recessions that feature financial frictions and heterogeneous consumers (Guerrieri & Lorenzoni, 2017; Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012) . On the empirical side, Bernardini and Peersman (forthcoming) and Klein (2017) explore timeseries variation in aggregate macroeconomic characteristics to document that the fiscal multiplier is higher during periods of higher aggregate consumer indebtedness. Bernardini, De Schryder, and Peersman (2017) is the study closest to ours. They use panel state-level data to explore how local business cycles and household debt affect fiscal multipliers. We augment this literature and offer new insights into the economic mechanisms contributing to debt-dependent fiscal multipliers.
Second, the expanding literature on state-dependent multipliers employs structural vector autoregressions and national aggregate statistics to evaluate whether fiscal policy is more effective in recessions than in expansions (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012; Ramey & Zubairy, 2018 ). In contrast to these studies, we offer an alternative cross-sectional empirical design that allows us to evaluate heterogeneity in fiscal multipliers in a given period. The granularity of our novel data also offers additional insights into the mechanisms responsible for state-dependent multipliers.
Finally, a growing literature empirically evaluates consumer responses to various forms of stimulus (Kaplan & Violante, 2014; Misra & Surico, 2014; Shapiro & Slemrod, 2003; Aaronson et al., 2012; Parker et al., 2013; Agarwal et al., 2007; Cloyne & Surico, 2017) . We augment this literature by documenting debt-dependent MPCs during a deleveraging recession: highly leveraged households tend to consume more in response to increases in DOD spending than less levered households.
II. Data and Sample Selection
A. Government-Spending Data In this paper, we use the new database of DOD contracts available at USAspending.gov. This official government website contains detailed information on DOD contracts signed since 2000. The data are based on DD-350 and DD-1057 military procurement forms. 5 The database covers purchases and obligated funds from $25 disbursements to large procurements up to $32 billion. Each observation in the data set corresponds to a unique individual contract between the DOD and a prime contractor. We observe the total contract amount (obligated funds) and the duration of the contract: from a minimum of one day in cases of outright purchase of ready-made goods or services to more than a decade in cases of large military contracts (the latter of which account for less than 0.2% of contracts). Furthermore, we observe the location, industry, and tax ID of the prime contractor and, in most cases, information on the locations (postal codes) wherein the majority of the work was actually performed. We also observe deobligated amounts (terminated contracts) that we remove by matching them to original obligations based on contractor ID, primary contractor postal code, and a dollar amount of the original contract falling within 0.5% of the deobligated amount. In the case of a match, we consider both contracts null and void. This restriction removes 4.7% of contracts from the sample.
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These DOD data are uniquely suited to evaluate our core question. DOD spending constitutes more than half of discretionary government spending. It is the third largest source of government spending (18% of the U.S. budget) after Social Security (25%) and Medicare/Medicaid (24%) and thus constitutes a significant force of fiscal stimulus during a recession. Not surprisingly, a number of studies in the literature have exploited aggregate DOD spending in evaluating the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth (Barro & Redlick, 2011; Ramey, 2011; Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012) .
The information on contract timing in the data permits us to build two measures of DOD spending. First, we construct DOD obligations that equal the total amount of new contracts signed in a given period less the amount associated with terminated contracts (deobligations). In this measure, we disregard the maturity of the contracts and the timing of actual DOD disbursements. Prior literature (e.g., Ramey, 2011) suggests that information in DOD obligations captures antic-ipation effects and therefore is more relevant for estimating the effects of fiscal stimulus.
We also build a measure of actual fiscal outlays: DOD spending. In the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers (Galí et al., 2007; Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012) , actual government disbursements are potentially more relevant for the propagation of fiscal policy. To build this measure, we allocate the obligated (and partially deobligated) amount of the contract equally across all months of the contract duration and then aggregate the monthly data into geographic spending estimates over considered time periods. In the rest of the paper, we report estimates based on both DOD spending and DOD obligations and for simplicity refer to both as government spending. 
B. Real Economic Data
To build various measures of real economic growth, we exploit two data sets. First, we obtain annual GDP data for 372 CBSAs from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Second, we expand our analysis to income and employment data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data set provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The traditional fiscal-multiplier literature focuses on GDP, yet the limited number of CBSAs covered in the data, as well as the inability to capture fine geography and industry variation in GDP, significantly limit our ability to conduct the analysis using GDP alone. In contrast, BLS data allow us to build two core dependent variables-growth in income and growth in employment-across counties, states, and a much larger set of CBSAs, as well as across different industries. We exploit this feature of the data in our tests.
Alongside the aggregate economic indicators within a given geography, we conduct the analysis by sector of the economy. Specifically, we evaluate how tradable and nontradable sectors react to consumer indebtedness and fiscal stimulus. To do so, we classify industries into tradable, nontradable, strict nontradable, construction, and other, following the classification scheme of Mian and Sufi (2012) .
C. Measure of Consumer Indebtedness
In this paper, we rely on consumer leverage as a measure of credit-constrained households. Specifically, we use the 2006 (and, for robustness, 2007) county-level consumer debt-toincome ratios published by Mian et al. (2013) . This measure captures total consumer indebtedness by accounting for all types of debt balances: mortgages, auto loans, credit card debt, and other forms of consumer credit. When appropriate, we aggregate this measure to larger economic geographies (CBSA or state) using population-weighted averages.
Our choice of proxy for debt-constrained households is driven by prior literature that explicitly links consumer leverage and deleveraging pressure during the Great Recession (e.g., Mian et al., 2013) . We validate this measure by documenting that high debt-to-income households do, on average, delever. Table 4 of this paper shows that the direct effect of debt-to-income on credit balances is negative and significant across all considered forms of consumer debt.
8 Furthermore, considering consumer leverage prerecession mitigates traditional reverse-causality concerns. It is highly unlikely that the depth of the economic downturn in the 2008-2009 period can affect predetermined consumer leverage in 2006 (2007) Finally precrisis leverage is measurable at the start of the recession, making it an actionable measure for policymakers.
D. Validating Government-Spending Data
Before we proceed with our analysis of the core question of the paper, we validate the new DOD spending data and our cross-sectional empirical design. Specifically, we report a baseline analysis of the open-economy fiscal multiplier using our new data and then compare the results to previous findings documented in the literature. In this analysis, we extend the instrumental-variable empirical approach of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) to our cross-sectional setting, ). We normalize both the dependent variable (difference in economic output) and the core variable of interest (difference in government spending) by the same beginning-of-the-period measure of economic output. Specifically, we normalize the change in government spending by total income (in cases of income or employment specifications) or total GDP (in GDP specifications). The coefficients β Income , β Empl , and β GDP capture the government-spending multiplier for different economic variables of interest. We conduct this analysis at different levels of geographic aggregation: county, CBSA, and state.
To account for differences in industry structure across geographies, we control for the beginning-of-the-period share of nineteen two-digit NAICS industries in local employment as reported by the BLS. Following Mian and Sufi (2015) , we also control for local demographic characteristics: the percentage of white people in the local population, median household income, median home values, the percentage of owner-occupied housing units, the percentage with less than a high school diploma, percentage with only a high school diploma , the unemployment rate, a dummy for urban areas, and the poverty rate at the respective geographic level.
Government contracts are notoriously political and hence potentially endogenous to local economic conditions. Politicians from more recession-prone or deeper-recession geographies might lobby for larger DOD allocations for their constituencies. To address this endogeneity problem, we adopt the Bartik-style instrument approach proposed in Nakamura and Steinsson (2014):
The instrument is the predicted change in government spending based on a location's average share of national defense spending and the total aggregate change in national defense spending. 9 The instrument relies on the aggregate variation in defense spending while eliminating the ability of the appropriation process to reallocate DOD spending in response to local economic conditions. The identifying assumption is that the buildup and drawdown of national defense spending associated with, for example, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are not responses to economic conditions in any particular city. Note that the instrument changes with each specification depending on the normalization variable (income or GDP) and whether the specification utilizes a DOD-obligations-based measure of government spending or a DOD-spending-based measure. Table 1 presents summary statistics of our core variables of interest. Panel A reports the growth in various real economic characteristics between the 2006-2007 and 2008-2009 periods using CBSA-level aggregates. We find that over this period, consumer income declined on average by 0.91%. We observe significant heterogeneity, with some CBSAs experiencing declines in aggregate wage income as high as 26% and some growing at a 31% rate. The average change in defense spending as a fraction of prerecession income is 1.1%, with a standard deviation of 5%. On average, the level of defense spending is 2.7% of CBSA income, with a standard deviation of 6.5%. The heterogeneity indicates that while for some CBSAs, DOD spending negligibly contributes to the local economy, the other CBSAs rather heavily depend on DOD spending. Table 2 validates our data and empirical approach by reporting the results of the instrumental variable analysis following equation (2). Panel A reports the cross-sectional IV . This can be attributed to the fact that our data provide information about prime contract vendors and do not capture the ability of vendors to subcontract or hire employees across county or CBSA lines. With smaller, less-populous geographies, the government spending is more likely to spill into or from other geographic areas. This potential measurement error is likely to lead to attenuation of our multiplier estimates.
11 Consistently, the multipliers increase with the size of the geographical unit. This would have been problematic if our goal was to obtain a precise estimate of the stateor city-level fiscal multiplier. Our objective instead is to determine whether the fiscal multiplier depends on consumer debt. Since the measurement error stemming from spillovers would affect the interaction term between DOD spending and consumer debt to the same extent, it should not affect our inferences.
We conduct our investigation of debt-dependent fiscal multipliers at the CBSA level. The county-level analysis offers the best way to capture heterogeneity in consumer debt but fails to capture an economically meaningful governmentspending multiplier. On the other hand, the state-level analysis captures a meaningful government-spending multiplier but is too coarse to capture heteorgeneity in consumer indebtedness. The CBSA-level analysis offers a balanced approach. In interpreting CBSA-level results, it is important to note that the local-income state-level estimates greater than 1 correspond to CBSA-level multiplier estimates of 0.37 (see table 2A ).
With this observation in mind, we further validate our data and empirical approach by conducting an additional CBSAlevel analysis. Table 2B illustrates that our IV results are fairly robust to alternative definitions of real economic activity: employment growth and GDP growth. Overall, results presented in table 2 establish baseline estimates of open-economy multipliers at the CBSA level and confirm the validity of the new 11 One can argue that with migration and trade in intermediate goods,
county-level open economies should exhibit higher multipliers than statelevel relatively more closed economies: it is easier for smaller regions to pull resources from surrounding areas, thus permitting larger output responses to fiscal stimulus. This argument, however, relies on government spending being confined within the borders of a given local economy. In our setting, the measurable DOD spending can spill over to other geographic regions and the rate of such spillover is likely to increase as the region size decreases. For example, 41% of the contracts are implemented in the postal code where the primary contractor is located. In contrast, 74% of the contracts are implemented within the same state. As we move to smaller, less populous geographic areas, this spillover would be more pronounced leading to smaller coefficients of interest. data on government spending in the context of evaluating the effect of fiscal stimulus on local economic output.
III. Consumer Indebtedness and the Government-Spending Multiplier

A. CBSA-level Analysis and Results
Armed with validated data, we turn to the core question of this study and investigate whether government spending becomes (in)effective when high-debt consumers are potentially credit constrained and have to deleverage. To evaluate this question, we alter the baseline specification (1) by incorporating the effect of prerecession consumer debt and allowing for a consumer-debt-dependent government-spending multiplier,
where
is the debt-to-income ratio in CBSA i in 2006. Notably, DT I 06 i is predetermined and exogenous to the change in economic growth during the recessionary period. β 2 is the core coefficient of interest; β 2 > 0 would indicate that expansionary fiscal policy is more effective in geographies suffering from consumer debt overhang, and β 2 < 0 would suggest that fiscal policy is less effective in areas with high consumer debt.
Given the potentially endogenous nature of government spending, we instrument both the direct effect of government spending, as well as the interaction between the change in government spending and the debt-to-income ratio. Specifically, we employ two instruments: a Bartik-style instrument described in equation (2), as well as its interaction with the 2006 debt-to-income ratio. Similar to table 2, we control for local industry structure prerecession and a wide set of prerecession CBSA-level economic conditions. Table 3 reports the results of this IV analysis for income growth. The results suggest that government spending creates relatively more economic growth in areas with higher consumer leverage.We document a statistically and economically significant positive coefficient β 2 for each measure of economic activity (income, employment, or GDP). Figure  1 summarizes the economic significance of the estimates by presenting the implied magnitudes of the governmentspending multiplier for different levels of consumer debt and different measures of economic activity. In case of income growth, a 1-standard deviation increase in the debt-to-income ratio (0.597) is associated with an increase in the DOD spending multiplier of 0.354 (0.608 × 0.597), or about the average CBSA fiscal income multiplier (0.37). One can also look at the economic significance from the perspective of DOD spending being able to mitigate the adverse effects of consumer debt overhang. The direct effect of consumer leverage is negative and economically and statistically significant. 12 In the case of income multipliers, our results suggest that a 1-percentage point increase in DOD spending relative to income reduces the direct negative effect of consumer leverage by 0.006, or about 16% of (−0.033) the DTI coefficient. The results based on DOD obligations exhibit stronger debt-dependent multipliers, with a 1-percentage point change in DOD obligations reducing the negative effect of consumer leverage by 0.01, or about 30% of the direct effect. One might expect the DOD spending multiplier to exhibit stronger debt dependence if heterogeneous MPC is the only relevant mechanism. If, however, as discussed below, debt-dependent multipliers are driven by local slack, then the DOD obligations-based multipliers might exhibit stronger debt dependency due to firms' hiring responding more to anticipated outlays.
B. Robustness Tests
One can argue that local economic and demographic conditions distinct from consumer leverage might drive our results. First, our core results might arise due to local economic conditions being correlated with DOD spending. For example, it is possible that the government systematically allocates a higher share of the DOD budget to poorer and more diverse geographies and that residents of such geographies face particularly strong borrowing constraints during the [2008] [2009] 12 These results are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with Mian and Sufi (2015) , who document that weakness in consumer balance sheets contributed to local economic slumps.
period, leading to a deeper local recession and biasing our coefficient of interest downward. Indeed, we find that DOD spending in general and our instrument in particular are negatively correlated with local income, housing prices, and the percentage of the college-educated and white population. To address this concern, we conducted robustness tests (not reported for breivity) where we control for an exhaustive set of cross effects between the control variables and prerecession DTI. If anything, the resulting coefficients of interest exhibit higher economic magnitudes, indicating the downward bias of the original estimates.
Second, one can argue that our results might be attributed to DOD spending multipliers varying with other local economic and geographic characteristics distinct from leverage. Ideally, to address this concern, we would like to control for DOD spending growth interacted with all local economic covariates. Implementing such analysis is not feasible with our sample size, as it requires us to instrument over thirty independent variables. To attenuate this concern, we conducted a series of tests where we controlled for the interactions between DOD spending growth and control variables one at a time. Overall, we find the results reported in table 3 to be quantitatively and qualitatively robust to the inclusion of additional interaction terms. 13 Combined, this evidence suggests that the debt-dependent DOD multiplier we document is unlikely to be driven by the heterogeneity in local economic or demographic characteristics distinct from consumer leverage. 
IV. What Contributes to Heterogeneity in the Government-Spending Multiplier?
While it is important to know whether fiscal stimulus is effective during consumer-debt-overhang-induced recessions, it is no less important to understand what economic mechanisms contribute to the heterogeneity in the fiscal multiplier. Existing economic literature offers a number of channels through which government spending can affect real output. In these theories, the efficacy of fiscal stimulus depends on its net effect on aggregate demand and whether aggregate supply can accommodate the increase in aggregate demand. In this section, we present a discussion and empirical evaluations of aggregate-supply and aggregate-demand economic mechanisms that can lead to debt-dependent DOD spending multipliers.
A. Aggregate Demand Economic Mechanisms
Changes in aggregate demand in response to fiscal stimulus are associated with changes in private investment or consumption (or both). Private investments, for example, tend to respond to changes in interest rates associated with fiscal stimulus, as well as to changes in the expected future marginal product of capital caused by productive public investment (Baxter & King, 1993) . Fiscal stimulus also can affect consumption. Some theories argue that it can decrease consumption through expectations of higher future taxes and increases in real interest rates. Others point to increases in consumption through increases in expected income (Murphy, 2015; Rendahl, 2016) , presence of credit-constrained handto-mouth consumers (Galí et al., 2007; Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012) , or declines in the real interest rate (Eggertsson, 2010) .
How do these theories inform the mechanisms that might be responsible for the debt-dependent multipliers we document? Theories that rely on interest-rate channels are unlikely to explain the evidence presented in table 3 since monetary policy is constant across cities in the United States. Similarly, our focus on defense spending rules out local public investment as a cause of heterogeneous multipliers. Our evidence is also inconsistent with arguments based on heterogeneous tax liabilities. It is unlikely that the current level of consumer leverage leads to a heterogeneous effect on individual future taxes within the United States.
The remaining demand-side channels rely on heterogeneity in the number of credit-constrained consumers. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) present a Keynesian-style model that demonstrates the efficacy of expansionary fiscal policy in a debt-overhang-driven recession. In their model, high-debt consumers are forced to deleverage due to a credit contraction. The resulting credit constraints that deleveraging households face imply that the consumption of high-debt (deleveraging) households responds more to government stimulus than the consumption of low-debt households. Similarly, Galí et al. (2007) present a model with hand-to-mouth consumers that dedicate all newly found income to consumption. Both studies imply that more debtconstrained consumers should have higher consumption responses to fiscal stimulus and, by extension, lead to higher government-spending multipliers in areas with higher consumer leverage compared to those with relatively low consumer leverage.
To evaluate the validity of the MPC-driven economic rationale for the debt-dependent multiplier, we turn to microdata exploited in the prior literature as proxies for consumption: individual credit card balances (Aaronson et al., 2012; Agarwal et al., 2007) and auto purchases (Mian et al., 2013) . Alongside consumption measures, these microdata allow us to capture debt-to-income ratios at a very granular individual level. Thus, we draw our inferences from heterogeneous consumer responses to DOD spending within the same geographic unit (CBSA). Our identification stems from debt-driven heterogeneity in MPCs across individuals exposed to identical labor market and DOD spending conditions.
Credit card balances.
First, we analyze the response to DOD spending of individual credit card balances using the anonymized TransUnion (TU) panel data provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. These data cover a random sample of about 10 million individuals residing in the United States and are reported as of February of each year. The data offer a rich set of characteristics of consumers' financial behavior, including total consumer debt balances, credit card balances, auto loan balances, and mortgages. The data also provide consumer characteristics, including credit scores, income, and the postal code of an individual's residence.
The TU panel is uniquely suited to evaluate our core question of interest since it reports individual consumer income modeled by TU using a proprietary model. To our knowledge, no other data set offers actual or estimated consumer income for a representative and geographically diverse set of individual consumers. To check the accuracy of the income measure from TU, we first aggregated individual-level data to the county level and correlated the resulting measure with county-level income reported by the BEA. The correlation coefficient is 68% and offers considerable confidence in the TU estimates.
14 Second, we aggregate the data at the postal code level and observe a correlation coefficient of 86% between TU imputed income and IRS postal code-level income.
Using individual total debt balances and individual income, we then build one of the core variables of interest in this study, debt-to-income ratio (DT I TU k ) at the consumer-level k as of February 2007. Finally, following the prior literature (Aaronson et al., 2012; Agarwal et al., 2007) , we capture individual consumption by examining growth in credit card balances. The Survey of Consumer Finances reports that for individuals with credit cards, about 67% of consumption is done via credit card accounts. About 69% of the individuals in the TransUnion sample have credit cards, and 78% of those exhibit positive credit card balances.
To evaluate whether individuals with higher prerecession DTI exhibit higher MPCs, we implement the following regression analysis:
where growth in credit card balances for individual k residing within CBSA i is the difference in individual-level credit 14 Note that all credit bureaus report information only about individuals who have a social security number and a credit history, so the aggregate incomes of TransUnion consumers and that reported by and to the BEA are expected to differ.
card balances between February 2008 and February 2010, normalized by individual-level prerecession income. 15 We winsorize the credit card growth data at the 1% and 99% levels to eliminate the extreme observations, which are likely erroneous. To be consistent with the prior analysis, DT I TU k is measured as of February 2007 (the end of 2006). We exploit previously defined measures of CBSA-level changes in government spending.
CBSA fixed effects control for a wide set of local economic conditions during the recession and absorb the direct effect of government spending. More important, CBSA fixed effects control for local labor market conditions and, as such, eliminate alternative explanations stemming from slack. Our identification is based on within-CBSA heterogeneous consumer responses to CBSA-level innovation in government spending. Consistently, we cluster the standard errors at the CBSA level.
CBSA fixed effects and the fact that government spending is exogenous to individual household financial decisions mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. However, it is still possible that, for example, a negative correlation between government spending and local income might bias our coefficients of interest β CC 2 . To eliminate this potential bias, we instrument the interaction term in this regression using an interaction between our Bartik-style instrument and individual debt-to-income ratios. Furthermore, following Balli and Sørensen (2013) , we demean the individual DT I TU k within a CBSA before interacting it with government spending.
Similar to our prior analysis, we control for prerecession local industry structure and a wide set of prerecession local economic conditions-though here, we measure these variables at the county level. In addition, we control for available individual-level characteristics, including (log of) consumer income measured as of February 2007. Notably, we do not control for individual credit score, number of credit accounts, or credit utilization. These consumer characteristics either directly depend on the debt-to-income ratio or directly contribute to higher consumer leverage and thus are capturing similar economic fundamentals, but less precisely.
Panel A of table 4 reports the results of the analysis. Column 1 suggests that in response to DOD spending, consumers with higher levels of prerecession leverage increase their consumption more than households with lower levels of leverage. The magnitude of the coefficients of the interaction term between DT I TU k and the change in DOD spending is significantly larger than the direct negative effect of prerecession consumer leverage. A 1-standard deviation increase in government spending (5%) almost fully mitigates the adverse effect of leverage on individual consumption (0.11 × 5% versus the direct DTI coefficient of −0.005).
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15 While we would like to narrow the window and restrict our analysis to the period after the onset of the crisis in the third quarter of 2007 to the last quarter of 2009, the nature of the data does not offer us this flexibility.
16 Table 4 also shows that high-debt consumers deleverage during 2007-2009 to a higher extent than low-debt consumers: the direct effect of debt-toincome on credit balances is negative and significant across all considered To further examine whether credit constraints are responsible for the documented debt-dependent MPCs, we conduct the analysis for subgroups of individuals in different credit score categories from the potentially most-credit-constrained subprime borrowers to the likely least-credit-constrained prime borrowers.
Panel B of table 4 reports the results of the seemingly unrelated IV regression, exploring whether our core coefficients of interest vary with individuals' prerecession credit scores: subprime, near-prime, prime, and superprime categories.
17 Consistent with the idea that credit constraints lead to higher MPCs, we observe that DOD spending has the largest effects on high-debt-to-income consumers if they are also in the subprime credit score category-that is, the most credit-constrained group. We observe the effect dissipating as we move to the near-prime category, and it is virtually nonexistent economically or statistically in top credit score categories. The results add further validity to an argument that DOD spending facilitates consumption by more creditconstrained individuals to a higher extent than that by less credit-constrained individuals.
Additional robustness tests indicate that these results are robust to a wide set of regression specifications, data sources used, and approaches to measuring growth in credit card balances. Furthermore, we find qualitatively similar results when we focus our analysis on subsets of consumers in an attempt to isolate individuals who are most likely to channel the majority of their consumption through credit card accounts: only for individuals with at least one credit card account and only individuals who have positive credit card account balances forms of debt. This evidence is consistent with tight credit constraints during the 2007-2009 period (Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012) and thus validates our choice of core variable of interest (debt-to-income).
17 Subprime, near prime, prime, and superprime are defined as individuals with VantageScore credit scores less than or equal to 700, between 700 and 799, between 800 and 899, and above 900, respectively. in all reporting periods considered in our analysis. All the robustness tests offer results consistent with those reported in table 4.
One can still argue that credit card-based evidence may be a manifestation of relaxation of borrowing constraints rather than evidence of higher MPCs driven by hand-to-mouth consumption. Notably, we are indifferent between the two explanations, because any additional dollar of debt is financing consumption and is therefore consistent with the notion that high-leverage consumers have higher MPCs. Yet to explore the relaxation-of-borrowing-constraints hypothesis, we evaluate how DOD spending affects individual-level consumer debt balances.
Columns 2 through 4 of panel A in table 4 report the analysis of different types of consumer debt and its response to DOD spending following regression specification (4). Here, instead of growth in credit card balances, we evaluate the growth in total outstanding debt balances, mortgage balances, and auto loans. We find no evidence consistent with government spending relaxing the borrowing constraints of high-leverage households more than that of low-leverage households. Once again, these results are robust to various dependent-variable specifications and sources of credit bureau data (additional robustness tests are not reported for brievity).
Auto registrations. One can argue that credit cards are not an ideal measure of individual consumption, as these accounts might still be capturing consumer borrowing behavior. To mitigate this concern, we augment our analysis of credit card balances with the one that uses a direct measure of consumption: postal code-level auto registration data from R. L. Polk (see Mian et al., 2013) .
These data are collected from new automobile registrations and provide information on the total number of new automobiles purchased in a given geography every year. These data capture actual consumption by households at a fairly granular postal code level. The addresses in the data are derived from registrations, so the postal code measure represents the postal code of the person who purchased the automobile, not that of the dealership. is the postal-codelevel consumer debt-to-income ratio that is based on aggregated individual-level debt and income data reported by TransUnion. We incorporate the same set of county-level controls as in the previous analysis. The hypothesis implies that we should expect debt-constrained households to exhibit more auto registrations in response to government spending (β AR 2 > 0). The results presented in table 5 are consistent with debtdependent MPCs and indicate that postal codes characterized by highly leveraged consumers tend to experience a larger increase in auto registrations in response to DOD spending during the 2007-2009 period compared to zip codes with less levered consumers. This increase in consumption is unlikely to be funded with debt (panel A of table 4). Combined, tables 4 and 5 offer strong evidence of debt-dependent MPCs and thus validate the MPC-driven economic mechanism underlying the debt-dependent DOD spending multiplier.
B. Aggregate Supply Economic Mechanisms
Aggregate supply constraints, however, can counteract the effect of increases in aggregate spending. In the simplest one-period Ricardian endowment economy, consumption declines one-for-one with government purchases regardless of the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers. In contrast, recent theoretical work argues that demand stimulus might be more effective during periods of high unemployment (Michaillat, 2012; Murphy, 2017) .
In Michaillat (2012) , an increase in government sector employment increases labor market tightness and crowds out private sector employment, thus diminishing the impact of government spending on economic output. Yet during the periods of high slack (high unemployment) in a local economy, the new government-spending-driven jobs have little influence on labor market tightness, leading to weak crowding out of the private sector. Consistently, prior empirical literature documents that fiscal multipliers are higher in times of high unemployment (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012) .
The prior literature also leads us to expect higher economic slack in geographies with higher consumer indebtedness. After all, higher consumer debt in combination with housing price declines contributed to household net worth shocks, and the local employment slump via depressed household consumption (Mian et al., 2013) . Combined, these two streams of the literature suggest that we might observe a debtdependent DOD spending multiplier due to higher economic slack in 2008 and 2009 associated with higher prerecession consumer indebtedness.
Implementing a direct empirical analysis of the slack channel is challenging since slack is endogenous to both local economic conditions and government spending. We approach evaluating the validity of this economic mechanism indirectly by looking at the real output in sectors of the economy that do not directly benefit from household consumption but depend on local labor market tightness.
First, we examine multipliers for broad sectors that exhibit differential dependence on local consumer spending: tradable sectors, nontradable and strict nontradable sectors, as well as construction and other (unclassified) sectors of the economy.
18 If only consumption-based mechanisms contribute to the debt-dependent multiplier, then we should observe only debt-dependent multipliers in nontradable sectors of the economy. Similar evidence in the tradable sectors would suggest additional, potentially supply-side, mechanisms at work. Table 6 presents the result of the analysis across different sectors following regression equation (4). To make the sector multipliers comparable, we normalize both DOD obligations and spending and growth in sectors' income by total CBSAlevel income in 2007 (i.e., total CBSA income, not sectorspecific income). Table 6 suggests that the multiplier increases with consumer leverage not only in industries affected by local consumer spending, such as construction and (strict) nontradables, but also in sectors that do not directly benefit from local household spending. The debt-dependent multipliers in tradable sectors are significantly above 0 and of similar magnitude to those in nontradable sectors. The largest cross-effect 18 Mian and Sufi (2015) isolate the consumption-driven mechanisms behind the adverse effect of consumer debt on real economic growth by focusing on the nontradable sector. Their test primarily relies on local consumer expenditure almost by definition. coefficient is documented for "other" industries that are difficult to classify into tradables, nontradables, or construction. The evidence suggests that economic mechanisms distinct from the consumer spending channel are likely contributing to the debt-dependent multiplier.
Second, to further validate the slack mechanism, we isolate industries that benefit from supply-side channels but are unlikely to be affected by consumption-based mechanisms. Isolating such industries is challenging since most industries ultimately produce consumer goods. We found only one industry that fits these requirements: the National Security and International Affairs sector (NAICS 9811). This sector is unique as it cannot directly benefit from increases in household consumption, but can benefit from local economic slack. Any debt-driven heterogeneity in the government-spending multiplier in this sector is unlikely to be explained by the individual consumption behavior. Table 7 reports the results. Consistent with the notion that household consumption does not directly affect employment and wages in this industry, we find that high prerecession consumer leverage does not have economically or statistically significant effects on this sector of the economy during the recession. Yet we observe economically and statistically significant debt-dependent fiscal spending multipliers in this sector. This evidence cannot be explained by any consumption-driven economic channel and is consistent with the slack channel.
To summarize, while tables 6 and 7 do not offer direct evidence in support of the slack channel, they do provide a strong indication that supply-side frictions such as local slack are likely to contribute to the debt-dependent multiplier. Along with our evidence from consumer microdata, these re- sults imply that both aggregate demand and aggregate supply channels contributed to the debt-dependent multipliers during the recession.
C. Multiplier during Periods of Credit Expansion
Notably, both economic mechanisms underlying debtdependent multipliers are unique to the recessionary environment and associated credit contraction. High debt-to-income leads to higher MPCs when consumers are credit constrained (Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012) . In contrast, during periods of credit expansion, individual indebtedness is not necessarily associated with credit constraints and high MPCs (Guerreri & Lorenzoni, 2017) .
Similarly, the relationship between leverage and subsequent slack was a particular feature of the Great Recession and was attributed to households' need to delever (Mian & Sufi, 2015) . During periods of credit expansion, leverage is likely to positively contribute to economic growth and lead to higher employment (lower slack) as agents borrow to finance their current consumption. Therefore, finding a positive correlation between household leverage and the governmentspending multiplier during an expansionary period would suggest a debt-dependent multiplier that cannot be attributed to binding consumer credit constraints.
To explore whether the debt-dependent multiplier is unique to the recessionary environment, we implement a cross- The results presented in table 8 confirm that the debtdependent multiplier we document is an attribute of a recessionary environment when credit constraints are likely binding. During the 2003-2005 period, consumer leverage positively affected economic growth (consistent with Loutskina & Strahan, 2015 ), yet we do not observe a positive relationship between government spending multipliers and local consumer leverage. If anything, during this period, high debt is associated with lower fiscal multipliers (although the estimates lack statistical significance), which may reflect the fact that the abundance of consumer debt and the associated increase in leverage reduces the efficacy of government spending in stimulating a local economy. It can also be indicative that abundance of debt stimulates consumption and by extension reduces slack in the economy.
V. Conclusion
The Great Recession illustrates the importance of consumer balance sheets during an economic downturn. A number of academic studies document that accumulation of debt by consumers set the stage for the 2007 crisis and then slowed the economic recovery. In such an environment, both fiscal and monetary authorities face the challenge of designing a proper policy response, particularly because high consumer debt balances are frequently invoked to question the efficacy of expansionary fiscal policy. "You cannot solve a problem created by debt by running up even more debt, say the critics" (Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012) . This paper empirically investigates how the geographic heterogeneity in prerecession consumer leverage affects the open-economy relative fiscal multiplier during the 2007-2009 recession. Using new transaction-level data on DOD spending, we document that during the 2007-2009 recessionary period, the DOD spending multiplier is higher in CBSAs with higher prerecession consumer debt-to-income ratios than in CBSAs with lower prerecession consumer debtto-income ratios. The evidence suggests that at least in the short run (two years considered in this study), expansionary fiscal stimulus has the capacity to mitigate the adverse effects of consumer leverage on local employment and income.
We augment these results by presenting evidence consistent with both aggregate demand and aggregate supply mechanisms. On the aggregate demand side, we find evidence supporting heterogeneous MPC-based explanations. Our results show that in response to an increase in DOD spending, households with high debt-to-income ratios tend to increase consumption more relative to households with low debt-toincome ratios.
We also find evidence consistent with local economic slack contributing to the heterogeneity in government-spending multipliers. Higher consumer indebtedness depresses household consumption and contributes to local unemployment. Yet it creates a more fruitful environment for fiscal stimulus because it leads to local excess capacity. In the presence of local economic slack, government spending is unlikely to crowd out the private sector, which in turn leads to higher government-spending multipliers.
Overall, our results contribute to the debate about the efficacy of expansionary fiscal policy and add to our understanding of the economic mechanisms through which government spending operates. While we are unable to quantify the relative importance of these demand-side and supply-side mechanisms, our evidence points to the importance of both channels and calls for future research in this area.
